Abstract Oblivious signature-based envelope (OSBE) schemes have demonstrated their potential applications in the protection of users privacy and rights. In an OSBE protocol, an encrypted message can only be decrypted by the receiver who holds a valid signature on a public message, while the sender (encrypter) does not know whether the receiver has the signature or not. Our major contributions in this work lie in the following aspects. We improve the notion of OSBE so that a valid credential holder cannot share his/her credential with other users (i.e., all-or-nothing non-transferability). We clarify the relationship between one-round OSBE and identity-based encryption (IBE) and show that one-round OSBE and semantically secure IBE against the adaptively chosen identity attack (IND-ID-CPA) are equivalent, if the signature in the OSBE scheme is existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosen message attacks. We propose an oblivious access control scheme to protect user privacy without the aid of any zero-knowledge proof. Finally, we also highlight some other novel applications of OSBE, such as attributed-based encryption.
Introduction
Internet services usually require users to provide their personally identifiable information (PII) for registration. Frequent registrations using PII could make the user traceable or even impersonated. Therefore, how to protect users' PII has become increasingly important. Aiming to protect users' privacy, some elegant solutions have been proposed, for example, privacy-enhancement scheme [1, 2] , privacy-preserving schemes [3, 4] , user-centric privacy management scheme [5] , identity management scheme [6] , etc.
Introduced by Li et al. [7] , oblivious signature-based envelope (OSBE) is a protocol, where a sender sends an envelope, which encapsulates a secret, to a receiver, so that only the receiver who has obtained a valid signature on an agreedupon message from the certificate authority (CA) can open the envelope and then obtain the secret. Further, the sender does not know whether the receiver has obtained the required signature. Hence, OSBE provides oblivious property for the receiver about the signature. OSBE is especially efficient in handing the cyclic policy interdependency problem in automated trust negotiation (ATN) [8] . For example, both Alice and Bob are agents of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). They can only communicate with other CIA agents. Consider the problem of creating a secure session between Alice and Bob. Due to their special identities, none of them wants to release their identities first. Therefore, no session can be created. OSBE can deal with this scenario efficiently. If Alice wants to initiate a session with Bob, she can send an envelope, which encapsulates her identity, such as her public key certificate, to Bob. If Bob has possessed a credential (signature on the message which can indicate the membership of CIA) from CIA, he can use it to open the envelope and obtain Alice's identity. Otherwise, nothing about Alice's identity is released to Bob.
Li et al. [7] proposed three OSBE schemes based on Rivest [9] , Boneh [10] and Rabin [11] signatures, respectively. The first one requires a two-round communication, while the rest are obtained from identity-based encryption (IBE) [12, 13] and require one-round. They pointed out that OSBE can be used in some schemes, such as ATN [8] , two-party secure function evaluation (SFE) and complicated policy requirements [14] . They also left an open problem that how to design an efficient and provably secure OSBE scheme from a DSA signature. They envisioned that OSBE can be used to construct oblivious access control (OAC) systems. The idea of OSBE has been also used to constructed secret handshake [15] , oblivious certificates and oblivious credentials [16, 17] .
Nasserian and Tsudik [18] revisited OSBE and solved the problem raised in [7] . They proposed several OSBE schemes from ElGamal signature family, such as Schnorr signature, Nyberg-Ruppel signature, DSA signature, et al. They also pointed out that OSBE can be used in Blogs and peer-to-peer (P2P) networks.
Proposed by Holt et al. [19] , hidden credentials are important primitives to protect services, access control policy and extremely sensitive private information. In a hidden credential scheme, a sender encrypts a secret and sends it to a receiver. The receiver must possess the required credential(s) in order to decrypt it. Hidden credentials have been used to conceal complex policies [20] and hide attributes in access control [4] . In these schemes, a receiver can access the resources if and only if his attributes satisfy the policy specified by the sender, while the sender knows nothing about the user's credentials. Moreover, he does not know whether the receiver has a credential.
Coull et al. [21] proposed a protocol for anonymous access to an oblivious database using stateful anonymous credentials. Here, a stateful graph was used. With each access, the user's state was transformed from one to another. For each state, the user must possess a corresponding credential from the credential provider. If all states were used, the user could not access the database again. Camenisch et al. [22] proposed another protocol for anonymous access to a database, which avoided reissuing credentials and was more efficient than that of [21] . In both schemes mentioned above, two building blocks were used, namely anonymous credential and oblivious transfer (OT). A user must obtain the required credentials from the issuer prior to access the database and then prove them to the database server in zero knowledge. The database server and the user execute an OT protocol to deliver the services selected by the user. As a result, the following features are captured: (1) Only the authorized users can access the database; (2) The database server knows nothing about the user's attributes; and (3) The database server does not know which services the user can access.
Our contribution
In this paper, we propose two OSBE schemes from the signatures that are existentially unforgeable in the standard model. We clarify the relationship between one-round OSBE and IBE, namely one-round OSBE and semantically secure IBE against the adaptively chosen identity attack (IND-ID-CPA) are equivalent, if the signature in the OSBE scheme is existentially unforgeable against the adaptively chosen message attacks. We improve the notion of OSBE. In our OSBE scheme, the credentials are non-transferable. While, in the previous OSBE schemes [7, 18] , the credentials are transferable. Based on our second OSBE scheme and the OT protocol proposed by Chu and Tzeng [23] , we propose an OAC scheme, which was initially introduced in [7] . Our OAC scheme captures the following properties: (1) The authorized user can obliviously obtain services without releasing his credentials and the content of the selected services to the service provider. Furthermore, the service provider does not know whether the user has possessed the required credentials or not. (2) Zero-knowledge proof is not required. So, our OAC scheme is more efficient in communication. (3) The credentials of the user are all-or-nothing non-transferable. Our OAC scheme can prevent illegal credentials sharing. (4) Our OAC scheme can resist the eavesdropping attacks [7] and provide forward security. Therefore, even if the credentials are compromised, nothing about the services which the user selected before can be revealed. We also point out the potential applications of OSBE in attribute-based encryption (ABE).
Paper organization
This paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, the preliminaries required throughout this paper are introduced. We clarify the relationship between one-round OSBE and IBE and propose an one-round OSBE scheme in Sect. 3. Then, a two-round OSBE scheme is proposed in Sect. 4. In Sect. 5, an OAC scheme is proposed. The applications of OSBE in ABE are described in Sect. 6. Section 7 concludes this paper.
Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the preliminaries used throughout this paper.
In the rest of this paper, by α R ← A, we denote that α is chosen from A at random. Especially, by α R ← A, we denote that α is chosen from A identically if A is a finite set.
By KG(1 ) → (sk, pk), we denote a secret-public key pair generation algorithm that takes as input a security parameter 1 and outputs a secret-public key pair (sk, pk). By A(x) → y, we denote that y is computed by running the algorithm A with input x.
Formal definition and security model of OSBE
The formal definition and security model of OSBE proposed by Li et al. [7] are as follows.
In an OSBE scheme, there are three entities: a sender S, and two receivers R 1 and R 2 . An OSBE scheme comprises three algorithms: Setup, Interaction and Open.
Setup. Taking as input a security parameter 1 , this algorithm generates the public parameters params, a signature algorithm (sign, verify) and a secret-public key pair KG(1 ) → (sk, pk) for the signature algorithm. It outputs two messages P and M, where P is the real message which S wants to send and M is the message which is agreed by S, R 1 and R 2 . It sends ( params, pk, M, P) to S, ( params, pk, M, σ ) to R 1 and ( params, pk, M) to R 2 , respectively, where σ = Sign(sk, M) denotes the signature on the message M. Interaction. For b ∈ {1, 2}, R b is chosen to interact with S. R b sends partial signature parameters to S. S computes an encryption key ek using the public parameters prams, the public key pk, the agreed message M and partial signature parameters received from R b , while the corresponding decryption key dk can be derived from the signature σ . S encrypts the message P as CT = E( params, ek, P) and sends CT to R b . Open. If b = 1, R 1 can compute the decryption key dk using the signature σ , decrypt the ciphertext CT and output the message P = D( params, dk, CT ). While, if b = 2, nothing about P can be released.
An OSBE must satisfy the following three properties: soundness, oblivion and semantically secure against the receiver. The security model of OSBE is defined using the following games. Definition 1 An OSBE scheme is sound if the probability that R 1 cannot output the message P in the above game is . Issuing Credential. Taking as input the parameters params, a service provider's public key spk and the receiver's public key r pk, this algorithm outputs a credential σ which can be used by the receiver to access the service items managed by the service provider with public key spk. Access Service Items. This is an interactive algorithm executed between a receiver and a service provider. The receiver takes as input the parameters params, his credential σ , his secret key rsk and an identifier η i , and outputs the service S η i . The service provider takes as input the parameters params and his secret key ssk and outputs nothing.
Correctness We say that an OAC scheme is correct if a receiver has obtained a credential on a service provider from the credential issuer, he can access the service items managed by the service provider.
Security model We define the security of an OAC scheme by the following properties. This model is similar to that in [23] .
Receiver privacy
1. The receiver does not reveal anything about his credential to the service provider.
For two sets of choices
. . , η t }, the transcripts received by the service provider for
Service provider privacy This property is defined by the comparison between a real world and an ideal world paradigms. In the real world, the receiver and the service provider execute the protocol. Meanwhile, in the ideal world, the functionality of the protocol is replaced by a trusted third party (TTP). The service provider sends all his messages {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n } to the TTP. The receiver adaptively sends his choices
receiver. An OT with access control can protect the security of the service provider, if for any receiver in the real world, there exists an probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) receiver in the ideal world such that the outputs of these two receivers are indistinguishable
We say that an OAC scheme is secure if it can satisfy the two properties mentioned above.
Complexity assumptions
Let G 1 and G 2 be two cyclic groups with prime order p. Let g 1 and g 2 be the generators of G 1 and G 2 , respectively. Let e : G 1 × G 2 → G τ be a map with the following properties:
Computability. There exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(u, v) for all u ∈ G 1 and v ∈ G 2 .
Definition 4 (Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH)
Assumption [24] ) Given a group G with prime order p and a generator g ∈ G, we say that the CDH assumption holds in G if for all probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms A
where the probability is over the random choice of a, b ∈ Z p and the random bits consumed by A.
Definition 5 (q-Strong
Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) Assumption [25] ) Let g 1 and g 2 be the generators of G 1 and
2 ), we say that q-SDH assumption holds in bilinear groups
→ c, g
≤ where the probability is over the random choice of x, c ∈ Z * p and the random bits consumed by A.
with prime order p and a generator g ∈ G, let x R ← Z * p , H : {0, 1} * → G be a hash function, and T G (·) and H G (·) be two oracles. T G (·) is a target oracle, which takes as input i ∈ Z p and returns w i ∈ G. H G (·) is a help oracle, which takes as input w i ∈ G and returns w x i ∈ G. Let q T and q H be the numbers of times which the two oracles are queried, respectively. We say that the CT-CDH assumption holds in G if for all probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms A
One-round OSBE
In this section, we clarify the relationship between one-round OSBE and IBE and propose an one-round OSBE scheme from BB signature [27] .
One-round OSBE and IBE
By one-round OSBE, we mean that the sender can send the ciphertext directly to the recipient without having to interact with him.
Before clarifying the relationship between one-round OSBE and IBE, we review the definition of IBE. Proposed by Shamir [28] , an IBE scheme is a public encryption scheme where the public key can be arbitrary string. The first satisfying scheme of IBE was proposed by Boneh and Franklin [29] . An IBE scheme consists of the following four algorithms:
Setup. Taking as input a security parameter 1 , this algorithm returns the system parameters pramas and a master secret key msk. KeyGen. Taking Identity-based encryption has been researched extensively. Schemes satisfying different security requirements have been proposed [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] . In [30] , Chow classified IBE schemes into six types, namely reduction improvement, multi-recipient and hierarchical IBE (HIBE), exponentinversion IBE, standard model (commutative-blinding), standard model (with user anonymity) and generations of IBE. Due to the fact that an OSBE is a semantically secure public key encryption, we only concentrate on the IBE schemes that are also semantically secure. There are two kinds of attacks on semantically secure IBE schemes. The first one is restricted chosen (selective) identity attacks [31] . The second one is adaptively chosen (full) identity attacks [32] [33] [34] . In the latter attack, an adversary can query the KeyGen oracle with adaptively selected identities, while this is not permitted in the former. We use the following game between a challenger and an adversary A to define the semantic security of IBE against the adaptively chosen identity attacks (IND-ID-CPA). We use the following three theorems to clarify the relationship between one-round OSBE and IBE.
Theorem 1 An one-round OSBE implies a(t, q I D , )IND-ID-CPA secure IBE if the signature in the one-round OSBE scheme is (t, q I D , ) existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosen message attacks.
Proof As mentioned in the beginning of this section, oneround OSBE is a semantically secure IBE scheme, where the master key is the signing key. The secret key for ID is the signature on m, where m = I D. The public key is the message and public parameters. If there exists an adversary A can break the IND-ID-CPA secure IBE from the one-round OSBE with advantage at least , we will show that there exists an algorithm B who can use A to forge a signature. Due to the encryption in OSBE is semantically secure, what we need to prove is that if the adversary A can compute a secret key for an unqueried identity, he can forge a signature for a message. We only consider the semantic security, namely the security of the secret key. Therefore, if Proof Naor (see Section 5 in [29] ) pointed out that any IBE scheme can be converted to a signature scheme, where the signing key is the master key in the IBE scheme. The public key is the public parameters and identities in the IBE scheme. The signature on a message m is the secret key for I D, where m = I D. To verify the signature on m, we can choose m , encrypt it using the patrial signature on m and try to decrypt the ciphertext using the signature. The difference between this signature and the traditional one is that the verification algorithm in the former is random, instead of a deterministic algorithm. So, IBE is a one-round OSBE. Since the IBE scheme is semantically secure, we will only consider the security of the secret key. If there exists an adversary A who can forge a signature for a unqueried message (identity), we will show that there exists an algorithm B that can use A to break the security of the IND-ID-CPA IBE. The proof can be deduced very similarly to the above theorem. Therefore, we omit it.
Based on the above two theorems, we can conclude the following theorem. Boneh and Franklin [29] claimed that a secure IBE scheme requires both a public key encryption scheme and a digital signature scheme.
3.2 BB signature scheme BB signature scheme was proposed by Boneh and Boyen [27] . This scheme is described as follows:
Setup. Taking as input a security parameter 1 , this algorithm returns bilinear groups (G 1 , G 2 , G τ ) with prime order p. Let g and h be the generators of G 1 and G 2 , respectively.
KeyGen. Taking as input x R ← Z * p , this algorithm returns y = h x ∈ G 2 . The secret key is x and the public key is (g, h, y) . Sign. Taking as input a message m ∈ Z p and the secret key x, this algorithm returns a signature σ = g [27] . 1 
Theorem 4 The BB signature scheme is (t, q S , ) existentially unforgeable against the weakly chosen message attacks under the q-SDH assumption

BB-OSBE
Based on the BB signature scheme, we propose an OSBE scheme as follows.
Setup. Taking as input a security parameter 1 , this algorithm returns the public parameters (G 1 , G 2 , G τ , g, h) and a secret-public key pair KG (1 ) → (x, y) for the BB signature scheme, where g is a generator of G 1 , h is a generator of G 2 and y = h x . Additionally, it generates a hash function H (·) that extracts a key for the semantically secure symmetric encryption algorithm E(·). It chooses two messages m ∈ Z p and P ∈ {0, 1} and computes a signature σ = g 
Interaction. S chooses t R
← Z p \{0, 1}, and computes 
(g, h) t and C = E H (T 2 ) (P). S sends the cipthertext (T
1 , C) to R 1 and R 2 . Open. Receiving (T 1 , C) from S, R 1 computes T 2 = e(σ,
Theorem 6 BB-OSBE is oblivious.
Proof In our BB-OSBE scheme, S receives nothing from R 1 and R 2 , so he cannot distinguish R 1 from R 2 . Therefore, BB-OSBE is oblivious.
Theorem 7 BB-OSBE is semantically secure against the receiver, if no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary can forge a BB signature.
Proof BB-OSBE uses a semantically secure symmetric encryption algorithm E(·), where H (·) is modeled as a random oracle. BB-OSBE is semantically secure against the receiver if there exists no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A who can compute the secret key which the sender uses to extract the encryption key with non-negligible probability. Namely, BB-OSBE is semantically secure against the receiver if no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A can win the following game against the challenger X with non-negligible probability: If there exists an adversary A who can break the semantic security of BB-OSBE against the receiver with advantage at least , we will show that there exists an algorithm B who can use A to forge a BB signature with the same advantage.
Given (m, g, h, y), the aim of B is to compute a signature σ * such that e(σ * , yh m ) = e(g, h).
B sends (m, g, h, y) to A.
2.
A submits two messages P 0 and P 1 with the equal length. 
Modified BBS (MBBS)-OSBE
Modified BBS (MBBS) signature scheme was proposed by Boneh et al. [35] and was modified and proven by Au et al. [36] . In this section, we review the MBBS signature scheme and propose an OSBE scheme from it. In our MBBS-OSBE scheme, a user's credentials are all-or-nothing nontransferable. By all-or-nothing non-transferability, we mean that all credentials of the user are shared, once he shares one of them with others [37] .
Modified BBS (MBBS) signature
The MBBS signature is described as follows.
Setup. Taking as input a security parameter 1 , this algorithm returns bilinear groups (G 1 , G 2 , G τ ) with prime order p . Let g 0 , g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g l+1 be the generators of G 1 , and h be the generator of G 2 .
KeyGen. Taking as input x R ← Z * p , this algorithm returns y = h x ∈ G 2 . The secret key is x and the public key is  (g 0 , g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g l+1 , h, y) 
MBBS-OSBE
Based on the MBBS signature scheme, we propose an OSBE scheme as follows.
Setup. Taking as input a security parameter 1 , this algorithm returns the public parameters P, g, g 0 , g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g l , h, y) to S, (m 1 , m 2 , . . . ,  m l−1 , g, g 0 , g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g l , h, y, σ, r, s) to R 1 , and (m 1 ,  m 2 , . . . , m l−1 , g, g 0 , g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g l , h, y) to R 2 , respectively. Interaction. 
S chooses t R
← Z p , and computes
and H (T 2 ), decrypts C, and obtains P. Before proving that MBBS-OSBE is oblivious, we introduce the definition of statistic indistinguishability proposed in [7] . Two distribution families D 1 ( ) and D 2 ( ) are statistically indistinguishable, if
is negligible in .
Theorem 10 MBBS-OSBE is oblivious.
Proof Suppose that two distribution families are , which is negligible in 1 . Due to 1 is linear in , the total probability difference between the two distribution is negligible in .
Therefore, (r ,ŝ) sent by the two receivers R 1 and R 2 is indistinguishable from the view of sender S, where (r ,ŝ) = (r, s) or (r , s ) . S cannot distinguish R 1 from R 2 . MBBS-OSBE is oblivious.
Theorem 11 MBBS-OSBE is semantically secure against the receiver if no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary can forge a MBBS signature.
Proof MBBS-OSBE uses a semantically secure symmetric encryption algorithm E(·), where H (·) is modeled as a random oracle. MBBS-OSBE is semantically secure against the receiver if there is no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A who can compute the secret key which the sender uses to extract the encryption key with non-negligible probability. Namely, MBBS-OSBE is semantically secure against the receiver if no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A can win the following game against the challenger X with non-negligible probability:
A sends two numbers (r , s ) and two messages P 0 and P 1 with the same length to X . If there exists an adversary A who can break the semantic security of MBBS-OSBE against the receiver with advantage at least , we will show that there exists an algorithm B who can use A to forge a MBBS signature with the same advantage.
1. Given (m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m l−1 , g, g 0 , g 1 , . . . , g l , h, y) , the aim of B is to compute a signature (m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m l−1 , g, g 0 , g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g l , h, y) to A. 2. A sends (r , s ) and two messages P 0 and P 1 with equal length to B. , h).
Theorem 12 The credential in our MBBS-OSBE is all-ornothing non-transferable under the computational DiffieHellman assumption.
Proof Given a credential (σ, s, r ), if an adversary A can compute T 2 , there will exist an algorithm B who can use A to break the CDH assumption as follows.
A can get the ciphertext (T 0 , T 1 , C) and compute
. Namely, given e(g, h) t and e(g, h) x u , B can use A to compute e(g, h) t x u . So, B can use A to break the CDH assumption.
Oblivious access control
In this section, we propose an OAC scheme based on our MBBS-OSBE scheme and the OT scheme [23] . Actually, our OAC scheme can be implemented by introducing an OSBE scheme to an OT scheme. In our scheme, a user needs to possess a credential from the issuer (manager) prior to access the protected services. Then, he can use his credential to obtain services from the service providers obliviously without releasing his credential and the selected services to them. The service providers only know the number of the services selected by the user if he has possessed the required credential from the issuer. Furthermore, the service providers do not know whether the user has obtained a credential from the issuer or not. Notably, zero-knowledge proof is not required in our OAC scheme. Additionally, the credentials of users in our scheme are all-or-nothing non-transferable. Our OAC scheme can resist the eavesdropping attack and also provide forward security.
CT-Adaptive t-out-of-n oblivious transfer
Chu and Tzeng [23] proposed an efficient t-out-of-n adaptive OT (CT-OT n k×1 ) scheme based on chosen target computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. The CT-OT n k×1 is as follows:
Setup. Taking as input a security parameter 1 , this algorithm returns a group G with prime order p and two hash function H 1 and H 2 , where H 1 : {0, 1} * → G, and 
Theorem 13 CT-O T n
k×1 scheme is unconditionally receiver secure [23] .
Theorem 14 CT-O T n
k×1 scheme is sender-secure under the CT-CDH assumption [23] .
Oblivious access control scheme
Our OAC scheme consists of the following four algorithms:
Setup. Taking as input a security parameter 1 , this algorithm returns bilinear groups (e, G 1 , G 2 , G τ ) with prime order p, where e : G 1 ×G 2 → G τ . It also generates three hash functions H 1 , H 2 and H 3 , where H 1 : {0, 1} * → G 1 , H 2 : G 1 → {0, 1} , H 3 : G τ → {0, 1} which is used to extract a key for the semantically secure symmetric encryption E(·) . Let g 0 , g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , g 4 be the generators of G 1 , and h be the generator of G 2 . The issuer generates his secret-public key pair KG (1 ) → (x, y) , where x R ← Z * p and y = h x . Suppose that there are n service providers S P 1 , S P 2 , . . . , S P n in the system. S P i generates his secret-public key pair KG ( 
S P i chooses
, and
Theorem 16
Our oblivious access control system is receiver secure.
Proof 1. In our OAC scheme, the service provider S P i cannot detect whether the user has a credential or not; otherwise, there will exist an algorithm B, which can use S P i to break the oblivion property of MBBS-OSBE. 2. In our OAC scheme, S P i knows nothing about the content of the service items selected by the user; otherwise, there will exist an algorithm B, which can use S P i to break the unconditional receiver-security of CT-OT n k×1 . This proof is the same as that in [23] . So, our OAC system is receiver secure.
Theorem 17 Our oblivious access control system is sendersecure under the q-SDH assumption and CT-CDH assumption.
Proof If there exists an adversary A, who has not possessed a credential, can get π i services from S P i , there exists an algorithm B who can use A to forge a BBS signature and break the sender-security of CT-OT n k×1 as follows: S i γ 2 , . . . , S i γ k , which the legal user selected, we will show that there exists an algorithm B who can use A to break the q-SDH assumption and the unconditional receiver-security of CT-OT n k×1 as follows: from A. B can use A to break the unconditional receiversecurity of CT-OT n k×1 .
Other application
Attribute-based encryption
Proposed by Sahai and Waters [39] , ABE is a public encryption scheme, where both the secret key and the ciphertext are labeled with sets of descriptive attributes. A secret key can decrypt the ciphertext if and only if there is a match between the secret key and the attributes listed in the ciphertext. In an access control system, a user needs to possess a credential (signature) for each attribute of him from the manager (issuer). These credentials are called attribute certificate. So, we can use our OSBE scheme to construct an ABE scheme as follows. Let E sign(sk,m) (P) denote the ciphertext of P, which can be decrypted if and only if the user has obtained a signature on m. Suppose that A k 1 , A k 2 , . . . , A k l k are different attributes, where k = 1, 2, . . . , n. If the manager wants to encrypt a message that can be decrypted if and only if the attributes of the user satisfy the following conjunctive normal form A 1 1 ∨ A 1 2 ∨ · · · ∨ A 1 l 1 ∧ · · · ∧ A n 1 ∨ A n 2 ∨ · · · ∨ A n ln The manager works as follows:
1. Generate his secret-public key pair KG (1 ) → (sk, pk) , where 1 is a security parameter. 
3. Decrypts C = E H (K ) (P) and obtains P.
Conclusion
In this paper, we clarified the relationship between the one-round OSBE and IBE. We proposed two novel OSBE schemes based on BB signature and MBBS signature. The credentials in our MBBS-OSBE scheme are all-or-nothing non-transferable. Based on our MBBS-OSBE scheme and an OT scheme, we proposed a new access control scheme called OAC. In our OAC scheme, legal users can obliviously obtain services from the service providers. As a result, the user does not release anything about his credential and the selected services to the service providers, while there are no aid of zero-knowledge proof. We also pointed out the potential applications of OSBE in ABE.
